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Abstract: We develop a reduced-form model of price transmission in a vertical sector, 
allowing for refined asymmetric, contemporaneous and lagged, own and cross price 
effects. The model is used to analyze wholesale-retail price dynamics in the US butter 
market. The analysis provides strong evidence of asymmetric price transmissions. It 
documents the complex nature of nonlinear price dynamics in a vertical sector and its 
implications for the distribution of future prices. It finds evidence that the asymmetric 
response to shocks is stronger in the short run for retail prices, and in the longer run for 
wholesale prices.    
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1. Introduction 
The issue of price transmission in a vertical sector has been the subject of much 
research. A common issue is that retail prices do not respond very quickly to changes in 
market conditions. Under fluctuating market conditions, this raises questions about the 
efficiency of vertical markets. Examples include situations where retail prices remain 
￿sticky￿ in the face of large decreases in farm or wholesale prices (e.g., Borenstein et al.; 
Peltzman; Miller and Hayenga). Peltzman finds strong evidence that in many markets 
retail prices tend to rise faster than they fall, both in the short term and in the longer term.  
This has stimulated research on the possible cause of asymmetric price 
adjustments. Two potential explanations have been explored: imperfect competition and 
adjustment costs. A traditional explanation under oligopoly is a kinked-demand schedule 
that generates sticky prices. More generally, barriers to entry can create asymmetric 
economic adjustments (see Tirole for an overview). Many other sources of asymmetry 
have been explored. In general, in the presence of adjustment cost, firms and consumers 
may not respond to small or transitory price changes until the benefits of changing 
strategies outweigh the cost. Consider, for example, the unequal cost of maintaining high 
versus low inventory, where the higher cost of experiencing a stockout can generate 
asymmetric price adjustments (e.g., Reagan and Weitzman). Also, consumers may not 
respond quickly to price changes in the presence of search costs. This can allow retailers 
to boost profits by increasing their prices fast as wholesale prices rise, and lowering them 
slowly when wholesale prices fall. In addition, menu costs can prevent firms from 
changing prices rapidly in response to small and transitory market changes (e.g., Blinder; 
  1Blinder et al.). Finally, sunk investment costs can create irreversibility in firms￿ strategies 
(e.g., Dixit and Pindyck). Thus, there are many reasons why price transmission may be 
asymmetric in a vertical sector. Peltzman￿s analysis suggests that current theories fail to 
explain the prevalence of price asymmetry. His empirical evidence covering many 
markets shows no correlation between price asymmetry and inventory cost, menu cost or 
imperfect competition. This raises significant challenges to our theory of markets. It also 
stresses the need for a better understanding of the empirical regularities found in price 
transmissions.   
The objective of this paper is to develop a dynamic reduced form model of 
asymmetric price transmission in a vertical sector. The analysis expands on previous 
models of dynamic price transmission by allowing asymmetry for both contemporaneous 
and lagged, own and cross price effects. The model is applied to wholesale-retail price 
dynamics in the US butter market. As illustrated in Figure 1, butter prices have exhibited 
large fluctuations over the last 10 years. This makes the butter market an interesting case 
study of dynamic price adjustments in a vertical sector. Following Peltzman, in the 
absence of a clear theory of asymmetric price adjustments, the analysis is unrepentantly 
descriptive. The empirical results provide strong evidence of asymmetric price 
transmissions in the US butter market. They also document the complex nature of 
nonlinear price dynamics in a vertical sector. They show how asymmetric price responses 
affect the distribution of future prices. By stressing the effects on skewness of the price 
distribution, they point out the limitations of previous models of price dynamics that 
relied solely on autocovariance (or spectral density in the frequency domain, as done by 
Miller and Hayenga). One of the main findings is that the asymmetry in responses to 
  2shocks is more pronounced in the short run for retail prices, and in the longer run for 
wholesale prices.  
 
2.  A Model of Price Dynamics 
Consider a vertical sector involving m markets in a vertical sector. Let yt = (y1t, 
y2t, ￿, ymt)￿ be an (m×1) vector of market prices at time t. Assume that the price vector yt 
has a dynamic reduced-form representation given by the vector autoregression (VAR) 
model
1 
yt = α + ∑  A
K
1 k= k yt-k + et,    (1) 
where α is an (m×1) vector, Ak is an (m×m) matrix, k = 1, ￿, K, and et is an (m×1) error 
term independently and normally distributed with mean zero and variance Ω.  This can be 
alternatively written in terms of the error-correction model (ECM) 




= k ∆yt-k + et, (2) 
where ∆yt = yt - yt-1, B0 = -[IK - A1 - A2 - ￿ - AK], and Bk = -[Ak+1 + Ak+2 + ￿ + AK], k = 
1, 2, ￿, K-1.  




= k ∆yt-k] is 
stationary. Obviously, yt being stationary is sufficient for ∆yt to be stationary. In addition, 
if yt is not stationary (e.g., in the presence of units roots), then a stationary ∆yt implies 
that [B0 yt-1] must be stationary. Such a process is cointegrated, and B0 identifies 
stationary linear combinations of the non-stationary variables (y1t, ￿, ymt)￿. In this case, 
the matrix B0 is singular and can be written as B0 ≡ β γ, where β is an (m×c) matrix, γ is a 
(c×m) matrix of c cointegration vectors, with c = rank(B0). In the error-correction model 
(2), the vector zt ≡ [γ yt-1] is stationary, reflecting long-term relationships among prices, 
  3and B0 yt-1 ≡ β zt (see Hamilton, p. 580). The general specification includes as a special 
case the situation where B0 ≡ -[IK - A1 - A2 - ￿ - AK] = 0 and (2) implies that price 
dynamics can be properly analyzed using a VAR in differences. However, when rank(B0) 
≥ 1, equation (2) shows that a VAR in differences is an inappropriate representation of 
price dynamics. 
The linear specification (1) or (2) can be extended in a number of directions. First, 
the intercept α can change over time in at least two ways: 1/ it can have a time trend 
(reflecting inflation, technical progress, or other long term changes); and 2/ it can involve 




= s Dts, where Dts is a dummy 
variable for the s-th season: Dts equals 1 if t is in the s-th season and zero otherwise, s = 1, 
￿, S. Then, (a0+ a1 t) is the intercept at time t in the S-th season, and a1 measures the 
change in intercept between two successive periods.  
Second, we consider the case where the dynamics in (1) or (2) vary between 
regimes. For simplicity we focus on the case of binary regimes denoted by the dummy 
variables R. Let Rit = 1 if yit is in regime 1 at time t, and Rit = 0 if yit is in regime 0 at time 
t, i = 1, ￿, m. In equation (2), let Bk = 
, k = 1, ￿, K-1.  This 
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j,t-k on ∆yit varies across regimes as ∂∆yit/∂∆yj,t-k = Bkij
1 Rj,t-k + 
Bkij
0 (1-Rj,t-k), which equals Bkij
1 when yj,t-k is in regime 1 but Bkij
0 when in regime 0. As a 
result, at time t, equation (2) becomes
2 






= is Dts + ∑ j B
m
1 = 0ij yj,t-1  







1 Rj,t-k + Bkij
0 (1-Rj,t-k)Bk] ∆yt-k + eit, (3) 
i = 1, ￿, m. Equation (3) provides a framework to investigate whether price dynamics 
vary across regimes. Indeed, prices would exhibit the same dynamics under both regimes 
if Bkij
1 = Bkij
0 for all (k, i, j). Alternatively, finding that Bkij
1 ≠ Bkij
0 for some (k, j, i) 
would be sufficient to conclude that price dynamics vary across regimes.
3   
Next, consider the Cholesky decomposition of the variance of et: Ω ≡ S S￿, where 
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ii > 0, i = 1, ￿, m. It 
means that equation (2) can be alternatively written as 
S
-1 ∆yt = S
-1 α + S





-1 Bk ∆yt-k + εt, (2￿) 
where εt = S
-1 et is normally distributed with mean zero and variance Im. Note that the off-
diagonal elements of S capture the contemporaneous effects across dependent variables. 
For example, the covariance between y1t and y2t is Cov(y1t, y2t) = s11 s21, and the 
contemporaneous impact of a shock in y2t on y1t is ∂y1t/∂y2t = s21/s11. Also, the 
contemporaneous cross-price effects vanish if sij = 0 for all i > j. Thus, the presence of 
contemporaneous cross-price effects can be confirmed by rejection of the null hypothesis: 
sij = 0 for all i > j. In addition, if we are interested in exploring whether such 
contemporaneous effects are situation-specific, we can consider the more general 
specification: sij = σij0 + σij zt, where zt is a vector of predetermined variables at time t, i ≥ 
j. In this context, constant contemporaneous effects across dependent variables implies 
that σij = 0 for all i > j. Alternatively, finding that σij ≠ 0 for some i > j would be 
  5sufficient to conclude that some contemporaneous cross-price effects vary over time. 
Econometrically, this corresponds to a situation of heteroscedasticity where the 
covariance matrix Ω ≡ S S￿ is time-varying. This provides a framework to analyze how 
contemporaneous cross-price effects vary with market conditions.  
In summary, the model exhibits three types of price transmission:  
contemporaneous cross price effects (captured by the specification for sij); lagged effects 
(captured by Bk, k = 1, ￿, K); and long term effects (captured by B0). The model is novel 
in the flexibility with which it captures these different dynamic price relationships. 
As discussed in the introduction, much recent research has focused on whether 
price dynamics respond symmetrically to price increases versus price decreases. The first 
area of flexibility, then, corresponds to Rit = 1 if ∆yit > 0 and Rit = 0 if ∆yit ≤ 0. In this 




1￿s capture asymmetric response to price shocks after k 
lags, k = 1, ￿, K. This extends Wolffram￿s specification, which restricts the Bk
i￿s to be 
the same for all k. By allowing the Bk
i￿s to vary, equation (3) allows for dynamic 
asymmetry to vary between the short run and the intermediate run (e.g., as investigated 
by Peltzman). Second, under cointegration, [B0 yt-1] is the ￿error correction term￿ which 
captures deviations from long-term relationships among prices. While equation (3) 
reduces to the Miller-Hayenga specification when B0 = 0, the Miller-Hayenga 
specification of asymmetric price response becomes inappropriate when B0 ≠ 0 (e.g., 
under cointegration). Third, the specification sij = σij0 + σij zt expands on both the Miller-
Hayenga and the Peltzman specifications. It allows for situation-specific 
contemporaneous cross-price effects. The Miller-Hayenga specification implicitly 
assumes constant sij￿s, thus restricting contemporaneous cross-price effects to be 
  6symmetric and constant (with σij = 0 for all i ≥ j). The Peltzman specification (Peltzman￿s 
equation (2) on p. 476) corresponds to equation (2￿) above with y1 = ￿output price￿ and 
y2 = ￿input price￿. It allows for asymmetric contemporaneous effects from ￿input price￿ 
to ￿output price￿, but implicitly assumes symmetric and constant contemporaneous 
effects from ￿output price￿ to ￿input price￿. The specification sij = σij0 + σij zt is more 
flexible and allows for more complex contemporaneous cross-price effects (see below).  
Finally, as suggested by equations (1) and (2), one must choose between 
estimating the model ￿in levels￿ (equation (1)) or ￿in differences￿ (equation (2)). Both 
approaches can generate consistent parameter estimates. Below, we focus on the 
specification ￿in differences￿ for two reasons. First, the estimation of models ￿in 
differences￿ can perform better in small samples (Hamilton, p. 652). Second, hypothesis 
testing is easier ￿in differences￿ as test statistics exhibit more standard distributions (e.g., 
the case of Granger causality; see Toda and Phillips). Thus, the analysis presented below 
focuses on the estimation of equation (3). Equation (3) can be estimated by maximum 
likelihood, which under a correct specification generates consistent and asymptotically 
efficient parameter estimates. 
 
3.  Application to the US Butter Sector 
We apply model (3) to price dynamics in the vertical sector for US butter. The 
analysis focuses on the dynamics of two prices (m = 2): the wholesale and retail prices of 
butter. The analysis uses monthly data from the period January 1980 to August 2001. The 
wholesale price is the Chicago Mercantile Exchange AA butter cash price, and the retail 
price for butter is from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.  
  7First, some diagnostic tests were conducted on each price series. The augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test for a unit root was implemented for each price separately. This 
was done based on a model with 5 lags in price differences (as suggested by the Schwartz 
criterion). ADF testing of the null of a unit root yielded t-values of  -0.635 for retail 
prices and -1.10 for wholesale prices. At the 5 percent significance level, the ADF critical 
value is -3.43. Thus, we failed to reject the null hypotheses of unit roots. This provides 
evidence that both prices are non-stationary.  
Next, we investigated the nature of price dynamics in the butter market. For this 
purpose, we relied on the specification given in equation (3). For the i-th price at time t-k, 
we defined two market regimes: Ri,t-k = 0 (regime 0) when ∆yi,t-k ≤ 0, and Ri,t-k = 1 
(regime 1) when ∆yi,t-k > 0. This provided a framework to investigate whether price 
dynamics differ for price increases versus price decreases, including both own price and 
cross price effects. In addition, we wanted to analyze whether contemporaneous price 
relationships change with market conditions. With m = 2, let y1 ≡ yr represent the retail 
price, and y2 ≡ yw represent the wholesale price. We allow the covariance between yrt and 
ywt to vary with market conditions and consider the specification s21 = σ0 + σr Et(∆yrt) + 
σw Et(∆ywt), where s21 is the off-diagonal element in the Cholesky decomposition of the 
variance of et.





Dts + ∑ j B
m







1 Rj,t-k + Bkij
0 (1-Rj,t-k)Bk] ∆yt-k. When σr ≠ 0 and/or σw 
≠ 0, this specification allows market conditions to affect the contemporaneous cross price 
effects between yr and yw. For example, finding that σr > 0 (σw > 0) would mean that an 
expected rise in retail price (wholesale price) would increase the contemporaneous 
covariance between retail and wholesale prices. Note that, unlike the Peltzman 
  8specification, this allows retail market conditions to affect the contemporaneous 
relationships between retail and wholesale prices. 
Applied to US butter prices, this model specification (3) was estimated using the 
maximum likelihood method. Based on the Schwartz criterion, the number of lags was 
chosen to be K = 6. The resulting econometric estimates are presented in Table 1. Many 
of the estimates are found to be significant. In general, the coefficients (αis) of the 
monthly seasonal dummies Dst show more evidence of seasonality in wholesale prices 
than in retail prices. Also, the time trend effects differ: the trend coefficient ai1 is negative 
and significant for wholesale price, while it is positive but insignificant for retail price. 
This reflects that the marketing margin (yr - yw) has increased over time during the 
sample period. Finally, most of the coefficients on lagged prices are significant, 
indicating the presence of significant dynamic adjustments in the US butter market. 
The nature of the dynamic relationships between yr and yw was investigated.  
First, we implemented a Johansen cointegration test for model (3). The null hypothesis of 
a cointegration relation between yr and yw was investigated using a likelihood ratio test of 
the rank of the B0 matrix. Testing the null hypothesis that rank(B0) = 0 versus the 
alternative rank(B0) = 1, the Johansen test statistic was 94.19, which is significant at the 5 
percent level. This, in conjunction with the results to the Augmented Dickey Fuller test, 
provides evidence that wholesale and retail butter prices are cointegrated, i.e. that they 
exhibit long-term relationships. On its own, it also suggests that a VAR in differences 
(e.g., as used by Miller and Hayenga) would be misspecified. 
Second, we test for Granger causality among prices. The null hypothesis of no 
causality between prices yi and yj requires Bkij
1 = 0 and Bkij
0 = 0 for k = 1, ￿, K-1, and 
B0ij = 0. Under some regularity conditions, the associated likelihood ratio test has a chi-
  9square distribution under the null hypothesis (Toda and Phillips). For i ≠ j, the Granger 
causality test statistic is 114.57 for the effects of lagged retail on wholesale prices, and 
132.40 for the effects of lagged wholesale on retail prices. At the 5 percent significance 
level and with 6 degrees of freedom, the critical value is 1.64. Thus, we strongly reject 
the null hypothesis of no causality and find strong evidence of lagged cross effects among 
butter prices. If i = j, the test investigates the presence of lagged own price effects. The 
associated test statistics are 136.53 for retail prices and 116.17 for wholesale prices. At 
the 5 percent significance level and with 6 degrees of freedom, we therefore strongly 
reject the null hypotheses of no own lagged effects. This provides evidence of significant 
dynamic adjustments in both wholesale and retail prices. 
Third, we evaluate the symmetry of lagged price effects. In the context of 
equation (3), the symmetry of dynamic effects of price j on price i corresponds to the null 
hypothesis Bkij
1 = Bkij
0, k = 1, ￿, K-1. Using a likelihood ratio test, the associated test 
statistics are 66.87 for (i, j) = (r, r), 28.09 for (i, j) = (r, w), 96.02 for (i, j) = (w, w), and 
107.89 for (i, j) = (w, r). Based on a chi square distribution with 5 degrees of freedom, the 
critical value is 1.15 at the 5 percent significance level. Thus, we strongly reject the 
symmetry of dynamic adjustments for all prices (i, j).  In other words, we find strong 
evidence that both own price and cross price dynamics exhibit asymmetric adjustments 
across regimes. The associated non-linearity in price dynamics will be explored in details 
below.  
Fourth, we investigate the presence of contemporaneous effects between prices. 
This is captured by the Cholesky term s21 = σ0 + σr Et(∆yrt) + σw Et(∆ywt). The null 
hypothesis that σ0 = σr = σw = 0 implies a zero correlation between yr and yw and thus 
zero contemporaneous effects between retail and wholesale prices. A likelihood ratio test 
  10of this hypothesis yielded a test statistic of 243.29. Based a chi square distribution with 3 
degrees of freedom, we strongly reject the null hypothesis. This provides evidence of 
significant contemporaneous cross price effects between the two butter prices.  
 
Fifth, we explore the nature of contemporaneous cross price effects. The estimates 
reported in Table 1 give s21 = 0.0358 + 0.7894 Et(∆yrt) - 1.4368 Et(∆ywt). As discussed 
above, the coefficients of s21 are jointly significant. In a long run equilibrium situation 
where Et(∆yrt) = Et(∆ywt) = 0, it follows that s21 = 0.0358, which is positive and 
significant. This means that yrt and ywt are positively correlated and that any shock in one 
price has a positive contemporaneous effect on the other. The coefficient on Et(∆yrt) is 
positive and significant, implying that an expected change in retail price has a positive 
effect on the covariance between yrt and ywt. The coefficient of Et(∆ywt) is negative and 
significant, showing that an expected change in wholesale price has a negative effect on 
the covariance between yrt and ywt. This provides statistical evidence that the 
contemporaneous effects of one price on the other are sensitive to market pressure. In 
particular, it shows that the contemporaneous linkages between retail and wholesale 
prices become weaker (stronger) when the wholesale (retail) price is expected to increase. 
This is another form of asymmetry between retail and wholesale butter prices. 
Finally, to evaluate explanatory power, predicted prices were obtained from the 
estimated model and compared with actual prices during the sample period. The results 
are presented in Figure 1. The model has high explanatory power and provides a good fit 
to the butter price data, with R-squares of 0.984 for retail prices and 0.886 for wholesale 
prices. 
 
  114. Implications 
The empirical results show strong evidence of asymmetry in price effects and 
dynamics in the US butter market. This asymmetry means that price dynamics are 
nonlinear in two ways: 1/ contemporaneous cross-price effects vary with market 
conditions; and 2/ price dynamics vary across regimes between situations of price 
increases and price decreases. These nonlinearities mean that, in general, the forward 
path of prices depends on initial conditions (Potter). As a result, the dynamic price 
response to exogenous shocks is typically situation specific. To evaluate the nature of 
dynamic adjustments in the US butter market, dynamic stochastic simulations of the 
estimated model were performed. The nonlinear dynamics imply that there is no simple 
way of summarizing price effects (since the results always depend on initial conditions). 
Below, we report some selected simulation results that illustrate the dynamic implications 
of the estimated model. 
The stochastic simulations were performed as follows. A random number 
generator was used to generate pseudo-random draws for the error terms εt = (εrt,  εwt)￿ 
distributed N(0, I2). For given initial conditions (say at time τ), these error terms were 
used to simulate forward the estimated model (3) with eτ+i = Sτ+i ετ+i, i = 0, 1, 2, ￿ , 
where Ωt ≡ St St￿. Repeated dynamic simulation generated a distribution of prices yτ+i at 
time τ+i, i = 0, 1, 2, ￿ This distribution simulates the distribution of predicted prices at 
time τ+i, based on the information available at time τ. In addition, for given pseudo-
random draws for the εt￿s, the dynamic simulation can be repeated after shocking the 
system at time τ. Comparison of the paths of the simulated series with and without the 
shock provides a basis for measuring numerically the effects of the shock on the 
  12dynamics of prices and their distribution. It measures the dynamic impulse response to 
the initial shock, which can shed light on the nature of price dynamics. We consider two 
kinds of shock: a shock in retail price at time τ, and a shock in wholesale price at time τ. 
The former is represented by an exogenous change in εrτ, and the latter by an exogenous 
change in εwτ.  
In general, under nonlinear dynamics, the impulse response depends not just on 
the initial conditions, but also on the nature and magnitude of the shock (Potter). To 
evaluate the effects of asymmetric price adjustments, we distinguish between positive and 
negative shocks to prices.  
The distribution of impulse responses to 40% shocks in wholesale price in 
December 1998 is presented in Figure 2.






th percentiles of the distribution over the 12-month period following the 
shock. In general, a positive (negative) shock in wholesale price has a positive (negative) 
impact on retail price, with effects that decay slowly over time. Figure 2 illustrates the 
asymmetric effects generated by a positive shock versus a negative shock. Indeed, it 
shows how the distribution of the impulse response can vary: compared to a negative 
shock, a positive wholesale shock generates greater short-term variability in wholesale 
price, but lower short-term variability in retail price. Also, Figure 2 suggests that the 
nonlinear dynamics generate a skewed distribution of retail price responses to a 
wholesale price shock (see below). 
Similarly, Figure 3 presents the distribution of impulse response to 10% shocks in 
retail price on December 1998.
7 Again, a positive (negative) shock in retail price has a 
positive (negative) impact on wholesale price, with effects that decay slowly over time. 
Here, the differences between a positive and a negative shock are not apparent: Figure 3 
  13shows similar patterns of impulse response whether the retail price initially rises or falls. 
However, it does indicate the presence of skewness in the distribution of the price 
response. In addition, the initial shock in retail price (0.21 $/lb) has a magnified 
contemporaneous impact on wholesale price (0.40 $/lb). This large cross-price effect is 
due to a high s21 estimate generating a large covariance between yr and yw.  
To show that the results presented in Figures 2 and 3 can be sensitive to initial 
conditions, we present the impulse response to a 10% retail price shock on September 
1995 (see Figure 4). Figure 4 illustrates the non-stationarity of the model: a positive 
(negative) retail shock tends to increase (decrease) retail and wholesale prices both in the 
short run and in the long run. The absence of decay over time is in sharp contrast with 
Figure 3. Yet the only differences between Figures 3 and 4 are the initial conditions 
(December 1998 versus September 1995). This indicates that stationarity conditions can 
become ￿local￿ in nonlinear models, making price forecasts much more complex. Both 
Figure 3 and Figure 4 show that, in response to a retail shock, price variability tends to be 
larger for wholesale prices than retail prices. This reflects, in part, the fact that the 
variance of ew is larger than the variance of er. Finally, from Figure 4, the initial shock in 
retail price (0.21) has a smaller short-term impact (compared to Figure 3) on wholesale 
price (0.15). This is because s21 is time varying: it is smaller in September 1995 than in 
December 1998. 
The implications of nonlinear dynamics for the asymmetry of impulse response to 
positive versus negative shocks are investigated further. Table 2 reports formal testing of 
the null hypothesis of symmetry (the distribution of impulse responses at a point in time 
is symmetric for a price increase versus an equivalent price decrease). This is done using 
a chi-square Pearson test. The results are presented for different initial conditions (shock 
  14date), for different shock sizes and at three time intervals (the 2
nd, 6
th and 12
th months of 
the simulation). First, Table 2 makes it clear that the magnitude of the shock has a large 
impact on the presence of asymmetry. The evidence of asymmetry is very weak in the 
case of a small shock (e.g., 1% shock), but becomes strong with increases in the size of 
the shock. This reflects in large part the piece-wise linearity in model (3): it may take 
large changes to switch from one regime to another. As a result, the model can still 
exhibit ￿linear properties￿ locally, i.e. in the neighborhood of some path. The non-
linearities become apparent only globally, when path changes are large enough to induce 
regime switching.  
Second, the evidence of asymmetry in wholesale price response tends to be weak 
in the short run but become stronger in the longer run (e.g., August 96). With the 
exception of retail price shock in September 1995, this applies in response to either a 
wholesale price shock or a retail price shock (see Table 2). It suggests that the wholesale 
market exhibits symmetric short-term price adjustments, but asymmetric long-term price 
adjustments. To the extent that asymmetry is motivated by adjustment costs, this 
indicates the presence of significant long-term adjustment costs in the butter wholesale 
industry. This includes adjustment costs in investment and capital formation in butter 
manufacturing. 
Third, in stark contrast to our results on asymmetry in wholesale responses, Table 
2 shows that asymmetry in retail price responses tends to be stronger in the short run 
(after 2 months) but declines in the longer run (12 months). This holds in response to 
either a wholesale price shock or a retail price shock (see Table 2). It indicates that the 
retail market exhibits significant asymmetric short-term price adjustments, and that such 
asymmetry becomes weaker in the longer run. Also, Table 2 shows that the evidence of 
  15asymmetry is in general stronger for retail price responses (compared to wholesale price 
responses). Again, to the extent that asymmetry is motivated by adjustment costs, this 
indicates the presence of significant short-term adjustment costs in the butter retail sector. 
This includes adjustment costs for consumers (e.g., search cost) as well as retailers.  
Finally, we evaluate the skewness of the distribution of impulse response. Table 3 
presents relative skewness obtained from the simulated effects of shocks in September 
1995. It also reports tests of the null hypothesis of zero skewness (corresponding to a 
symmetric distribution of an impulse response around its mean). This is done using the 
Bera-Jarque test. The evidence against the null hypothesis is weaker when considering 
the effect of a positive wholesale shock on the retail price. However, the statistical 
evidence of skewness is rather strong in all other cases, and is found to be stronger in the 
longer term. The importance of skewness points out that mean-variance representations 
cannot provide sufficient statistics for the distribution of future prices. This shows the 
limitations of previous analyses of price dynamics based solely on autocovariance (or 
spectral density in the frequency domain, as used by Miller and Hayenga). Table 3 also 
shows that positive shocks tend to generate positive skewness for own price shocks and 
negative skewness for cross price ones (with opposite effects obtained under negative 
shocks). This means that an unanticipated shock in price yit increases the relative 
probability mass in the tail of the distribution of prices yit￿ in the direction of the initial 
shock, for t￿ > t. And it decreases the relative probability mass in the tail of the 
distribution of prices yjt￿ in the direction of the shock for j ≠ i, t￿ > t. This illustrates how 
non-linear dynamics and asymmetric adjustments affect the distribution of future prices 
in a marketing channel.   
 
  165. Concluding  remarks 
This paper developed a model of asymmetric price transmission in a vertical 
sector, allowing for refined asymmetry for both contemporaneous and lagged own and 
cross price effects. Applied to wholesale-retail price dynamics in the US butter market, 
the model provides strong evidence of asymmetric price transmissions. The asymmetry 
generates nonlinear dynamics in price adjustments in a vertical sector. We document the 
complex nature of price dynamics in the butter market. First, the effects of market shocks 
depend on initial conditions. For example, the impact of a change in retail price on 
wholesale price is found to vary significantly with market conditions (see Figures 1 and 
3). Also, the evidence of asymmetry grows with the size of the shock. Second, we show 
how asymmetric price responses affect the distribution of prices. We find strong evidence 
of skewness in the response to large price shocks. For example, an unanticipated increase 
in wholesale price tends to create positive skewness in the distribution of future 
wholesale price, but negative skewness in the distribution of future retail price. This 
highlights the limitations of previous analyses of price dynamics that relied only on the 
autocovariance (or spectral density in the frequency domain). Third, for retail price, the 
asymmetric response is stronger in the short run but declines in the longer run. This is 
consistent with the presence of consumer search costs and/or menu costs facing retailers. 
Fourth, in contrast with retail price, the evidence of asymmetry in wholesale price 
response is weak in the short run but stronger in the longer run. This is consistent with the 
presence of sunk costs in investment and capital formation in the butter sector.  
The analysis has focused on vertical price adjustments in the butter sector. It can 
be extended in several directions. First, it would useful to investigate whether our 
empirical findings hold for other sectors. Second, there may be more complex forms of 
  17nonlinear dynamics that are relevant in vertical price adjustments. Finally, following 
Peltzman, our empirical findings suggest significant challenges for improving our 
conceptual understanding of dynamic market adjustments. These are good topics for 
further research.     
 
  18Table 1: Maximum likelihood estimate of the parameters 
 
Parameter  Estimate  Std. Error Parameter  Estimate  Std. Error 
aw0  -0.1562** 0.0574 ar0  -0.0934** 0.0217 
aw1              -0.0003*  0.0002  ar1               0.0001  0.0001 
αw1             0.0849** 0.0249 αr1              0.0804** 0.0104 
αw2             0.0648** 0.0275 αr2              0.0162 0.0128 
αw3             0.0952** 0.0373 αr3              0.0292** 0.0115 
αw4             0.0571* 0.0328  αr4              0.0098 0.0205 
αw5             0.0770** 0.0261 αr5              0.0451** 0.0115 
αw6             0.0939** 0.0327 αr6              0.0067 0.0107 
αw7             0.0712** 0.0288 αr7              0.0016 0.0132 
αw8             0.0943** 0.0359 αr8              0.0081 0.0110 
αw9             0.0760** 0.0351 αr9              -0.0122 0.0111 
αw10            0.0527** 0.0218 αr10            0.0008 0.0069 
αw11            0.0812** 0.0354 αr11            -0.0329** 0.0101 
B1ww
1          0.2064**  0.0841  B1rw
1          0.5834** 0.0613 
B1ww
0          0.2635**  0.0631  B1rw
0          0.5712** 0.0495 
B2ww
1          0.2013**  0.0753  B2rw
1          0.2708** 0.0570 
B2ww
0          0.0726  0.0914  B2rw
0         0.3770** 0.0420 
B3ww
1          0.4104**  0.1135  B3rw
1          0.5031** 0.0591 
B3ww
0          0.0342  0.0507  B3rw
0          0.2338** 0.0762 
B4ww
1          -0.4495**  0.1914  B4rw
1          0.1509** 0.0507 
B4ww
0          0.0850  0.0619  B4rw
0         0.2230** 0.0715 
B5ww
1          -0.1296*  0.0742  B5rw
1          0.0332  0.0645 
B5ww
1          0.4816**  0.1519  B5rw
1          0.2997** 0.0439 
B1wr
1           0.0848  0.0894  B1rr
1           0.0180  0.0744 
B1wr
0           -0.6344**  0.2052  B1rr
0           -0.6602** 0.0746 
B2wr
1           -0.5860**  0.1989  B2rr
1           -0.3567** 0.0630 
B2wr
0           0.3828**  0.1674  B2rr
0           -0.0215  0.0807 
B3wr
1           0.0206  0.0960  B3rr
1           -0.3580** 0.0675 
B3wr
0           -0.3387**  0.1367  B3rr
0           -0.3502** 0.0920 
B4wr
1           0.2694**  0.0912  B4rr
1          0.2885** 0.0855 
B4wr
0          -0.1458  0.0990  B4rr
0         -0.4615** 0.0778 
B5wr
1           -0.1013  0.0777  B5rr
1          -0.0574  0.0638 
B5wr
1           -0.1119  0.0961  B5rr
1           0.1480*  0.0892 
B0ww           -0.1049*  0.0593  B0rw           0.0429  0.0335 
B0wr            0.1253**  0.0547  B0rr            0.0037  0.0251 
s11              0.0458**  0.0028  σ0              0.0344*  0.0180 
s22              0.0501**  0.0030  σw              -2.4823** 0.9699 
     σr               0.8692** 0.3920   
Log Likelihood = 824.5952.  Number of Observations = 254. 
** means |t|-value greater than 2; * means |t|-value greater than 1.6 
 
 
  19Table 2: Testing the symmetry of impulse price response to a price increase versus a 
price decrease 
 
P-Values for the Null Hypothesis that Wholesale Shocks Produce
Symmetric Wholesale Price Responses   
P-Values for the Null Hypothesis that 
Retail Shocks Produce Symmetric 





















Jan-82  2  0.9935 0.4231 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000   Jan-82  2  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000 
  6  0.9267 0.5930 0.1704 0.0022 0.0002     6  0.6376  0.0003  0.0000 
  12  0.9912 0.2861 0.0007 0.0000 0.0000     12  0.5114  0.7442  0.0520 
Sep-95  2  0.9998 0.9966 0.9688 0.8281 0.3330   Sep-95  2  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000 
  6  0.9979 0.9843 0.6468 0.0021 0.0001     6  0.9988  0.7743  0.2477 
  12  0.9968 0.6265 0.0463 0.0000 0.0000     12  0.9985  0.8215  0.8254 
Aug-96 2  1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9980   Aug-96  2  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000 
  6  0.9997 0.9965 0.9432 0.9392 0.7191     6  0.9985  0.3943  0.0471 
  12  0.9989 0.8897 0.8629 0.7049 0.2581     12  0.9975  0.5421  0.0074 
Dec-98  2  0.9960 0.8172 0.4611 0.0001 0.0000   Dec-98  2  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000 
  6  0.9981 0.9715 0.8441 0.0946 0.0028     6  0.9997  0.8877  0.0733 
  12  0.9808 0.1176 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000     12  0.9911  0.4985  0.0001 
P-Values for the Null Hypothesis that Wholesale Shocks Produce
Symmetric Retail Price Responses   
P-Values for the Null Hypothesis that 
Retail Shocks Produce Symmetric  





















Jan-82  2  0.9398 0.0025 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000   Jan-82  2  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
  6  0.9975 0.7555 0.0154 0.0000 0.0000     6  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
  12  0.5994 0.9613 0.2638 0.0000 0.0000     12  0.4657  0.0000  0.0000 
Sep-95  2  0.9682 0.1342 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000   Sep-95  2  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
  6  0.8702 0.0150 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000     6  0.9236  0.0042  0.0000 
  12  0.9854 0.5873 0.0351 0.0000 0.0000     12  0.9886  0.9113  0.4137 
Aug-96 2  0.9996 0.4583 0.0362 0.0000 0.0000   Aug-96  2  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
  6  0.9995 0.9426 0.7110 0.1203 0.0000     6  0.8575  0.0014  0.0000 
  12  0.9939 0.8864 0.2188 0.0854 0.0087     12  0.8755  0.0000  0.0000 
Dec-98  2  0.9602 0.0060 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000   Dec-98  2  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
  6  0.9276 0.0008 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000     6  0.9899  0.2603  0.0000 
  12  0.9477 0.1138 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000     12  0.9960  0.4684  0.0009 
 
 
  20Table 3: Skewness of the distribution of impulse response (September 1995 shocks)  
 
  A Positive Wholesale Shock  A Positive Retail Shock 
Responding 
Price: Wholesale  Retail  Wholesale  Retail 
Month 
Relative 
Skewness  P-Value 
Relative 
Skewness  P-Value 
Relative 
Skewness  P-Value 
Relative 
Skewness  P-Value 
1  0.999103 0.0000 -1.0019  0.0000  0.999909 0.0000 0.999585 0.0000 
2  0.018136 0.7322  -0.12991 0.0935 -0.10688 0.1677  -1.0005  0.0000 
3  0.85994  0.0000  -0.26077 0.0008 -0.87527 0.0000  -0.10676 0.1681 
4  0.956083 0.0000  -0.16268 0.0357 -1.19661 0.0000  0.232713 0.0027 
5  1.512311 0.0000  -0.04885 0.5283 -1.38537 0.0000  0.580954 0.0000 
6  1.688903 0.0000  -0.14151 0.0677 -1.83915 0.0000  0.816  0.0000 
7  1.769619 0.0000 -0.06146 0.4275  -1.5596  0.0000 0.830869 0.0000 
8  2.525748 0.0000  -0.11229 0.1472 -1.40426 0.0000  0.664662 0.0000 
9  4.288709 0.0000  -0.11962 0.1225 -1.44261 0.0000  0.951117 0.0000 
10  6.150138 0.0000 -0.2188  0.0047  -1.65875 0.0000 0.650639 0.0000 
11  5.770587 0.0000  -0.21556 0.0054 -1.63818 0.0000  0.868161 0.0000 
12  2.491966 0.0000  -0.35109 0.0000 -2.31332 0.0000  1.074575 0.0000 
  A Negative Wholesale Shock  A Negative Retail Shock 
Responding 










1  -0.9987  0.0000  1.001285 0.0000 -0.99916 0.0000  -0.99955 0.0000 
2  -0.01632 0.8331 0.125657 0.1048  0.106875 0.1677 1.000401 0.0000 
3  0.040325 0.6027 -0.22315 0.0040  0.875086 0.0000 0.106875 0.1677 
4  -0.16857 0.0295  -0.21401 0.0057 1.191057 0.0000  -0.26156 0.0007 
5  -0.60019 0.0000 0.244514 0.0016  1.417848 0.0000 -0.55379 0.0000 
6  -0.6913  0.0000 0.472841 0.0000  1.924504 0.0000 -0.8149  0.0000 
7  -0.78773 0.0000 0.450066 0.0000  1.545587 0.0000 -0.83036 0.0000 
8 -1.0791  0.0000  0.61254  0.0000  1.638787  0.0000  -0.81439  0.0000 
9  -2.19873 0.0000 0.711232 0.0000  1.507778 0.0000 -1.14421 0.0000 
10  -3.28016 0.0000 0.751143 0.0000  1.738341 0.0000 -0.73588 0.0000 
11  -2.62252 0.0000 0.745978 0.0000  2.019929 0.0000 -0.93841 0.0000 
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  28Footnotes 













1 See Zellner and Palm for a discussion of the linkages between a structural model of 
price determination and the time series representation (1).  
2 Note that equation (3) can be equivalently expressed in ￿levels￿ as 
yit = ai0+ ai1 t + ∑  αis Dts + ∑ ∑ [Akij
1 Rj,t-k + Akij
0 (1-Rj,t-k)Bk] yt-k + eit, 
i, = 1, ￿, m, where the A￿s satisfy ∑ Akij
1 = ∑ Akij
0, for i, j = 1, ￿, m.   
3 Equation (3) restricts the B0ij￿s to be the same across regimes. It assumes that 
cointegration relationships among the dependent variables are not regime specific. This 
will prove convenient in the implementation of the Johansen test for cointegration (see 
below).  
4 More general forms of asymmetry can treat the regime switching as endogenous. This 
includes threshold autoregression (TAR; see Hansen, and Koop and Potter), or Markov 
chains with regime switching (e.g., Hamilton, chapter 22). 
5 Allowing the sij￿s to become time-varying means that the model specification changes 
with the ordering of the prices. To evaluate this issue, we also estimated the same model 
with y1 = yw and y2 = yr. This resulted in a lower log-likelihood value of the sample.   
6 The choice of 40 percent was made to reflect some of the larger shocks to wholesale 
butter price observed during the sample period.   
7 A 10 percent shock reflects some of the larger shocks to retail butter price observed 
during the sample period. 
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